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The old retributive view of penology was to a
large extent based upon the idea that a person
convicted of a crime was an "outlaw" without
legally protected rights. Gradually, however, as a
result of nineteenth century humanitarian in-
fluences, corrective treatment, reform and re-
habilitation came to be regarded as more desirable
principles of penology. Along with this change in
attitude came much needed reform in the treat-
ment of prisoners initiated by the prison system
administrators.1
Courts, on the other hand, concerned themselves
mainly with protecting the rights of persons
accused of a crime rather than with defining the
rights of those already convicted. The determina-
tion of prisoner rights was generally left to the
administrative discretion of prison officials.2 The
judicial basis for affording this wide administrative
discretion was the belief that the courts were
without power to supervise prison administration
or interfere with the ordinary rules and regulations
of penal institutions.3 This "hands-off" doctrine
I Tappan, The Legal Rights of Prisoners, 293 ANNALs
99 (1954).
21d
3 Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954); In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 955 (1951); Stroud v.
Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
829 (1951); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir.
1948); Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa.
1958); Commonwealth ex rd. Smith v. Banmiller, 194
Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1962); Cooke v. Tram-
burg, 43 N.J. 514, 205 A.2d 889 (1964).
continues to be applied by a majority of courts
today, and may be given particular emphasis
when federal courts are called upon to review com-
plaints of state inmates.
4
Generally, if a court adheres to the "hands-off"
doctrine the allegations contained in a prisoner's
petition will not be examined, and as a result, no
inquiry will be made to determine whether the
asserted claims warrant relief. Two related bases
appear to underlie this doctrine. One is the separa-
tion of powers principle of government. It is
argued that the judiciary should not interfere
with the executive function of prison administra-
tion.5 The second is the fear that judicial review of
administrative decisions will seriously interfere
with the ability of prison officials to carry out the
objectives of the penal system.6 As one commenta-
tor has pointed out, however, neither of these
rationale constitutes a satisfactory basis for deny-
4 See e.g., Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 384 U.S. 966 (1966), at 504 where the court
said:
In the event that inmates of state prisons within
the Seventh Circuit persist in bringing actions in the
federal courts in which the complaints are based
upon various matters concerning the rules and
regulations in effect in those prisons, and such
matters are brought to this court on appeal, it is
likely, in the ordinary case, that this court will
dispose of the appeal either by a per curiam opinion
or by an order.
5 Powel v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir.
1949).6 Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D.
Va. 1953); See generally cases cited in note 3 supra.
PRISON RESTRICTIONS-PRISONER RIGHTS
ing a prisoner judicial review of administrative
action7 The mere delegation of authority to the
executive does not immunize its acts from review
by the judiciary. Furthermore, the detrimental
effects of such review on the penal purposes of
restraint, deterrence, and rehabilitation, or on the
maintenance of an orderly prison, are much
exaggerated-if not completely untenable.
During the past twenty-five years, a number of
courts have recognized that the "hands-off"
doctrine is not a satisfactory principle in prisoner
litigation, and a trend has been noted away from
it.8 Perhaps the leading statement indicative of
this trend was made in dictum by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Coffin v. Reichard.9
The court stated: "A prisoner retains all the
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly,
or by necessary implication, taken from him by
law." ' 0 If the courts are prepared to face the task
of defining what rights are taken away by "neces-
sary implication" rather than leave it wholly
within the discretion of administrative officials,
they will of necessity have to strike a balance
between prisoner and prison interests. This
comment will examine the rights that are ascribed
to prisoners today and the practical problems
encountered in managing a prison; additionally,
some suggestions on how the conflicting interests
might be partially resolved will be made. Three
areaswillbeconsidered: freedom of speech, freedom
of religious practice, and the right of access to the
courts.
FREEDom OF SPEECH
The right of prisoners to communicate with the
outside world, essentially through use of the mails
and conversation with visitors, is subject to restric-
tions. Prison regulations usually provide for an
approved mailing list consisting of the names of
persons with whom a prisoner may correspond.
In Fussa v. Taylor, a prisoner received permission
to write to his common law wife who was incar-
cerated at the state reformatory for female
prisoners. Upon receipt at the state reformatory,
the letter was confiscated and returned along with a
For a full critique of the rationale behind the
"hands-off" doctrine see Comment, Beyond the Kin of
the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YAT L.E . 506 (1963).
8 Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The De-
veloping Law, 110 U. oF PA. L. R.v. 985 (1962).
0 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
887 (1945).
0 Id. at 445.
"1168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
note to the petitioner's warden. In the note, the
reformatory superintendent stated that he found
no constructive elements in the relationship of the
two inmates and did not approve of their corre-
sponding. As a result, petitioner's warden cancelled
his mailing privilege with this woman. In upholding
the action taken by the warden, the court held
that such a restriction was an ordinary mail
regulation within penitentiary rules, and being
such, the court would not interfere with the ad-
ministration of it.
Prison rules may also specify what persons are
allowed to visit the prisoner. In Abamine v.
Murphy,12 a prisoner in a maximum security jail
was not allowed a visit from his wife who at that
time was free on bail, awaiting trial on theft
charges. A prison rule provided that any person
who had been released from the jail could not
visit an inmate within thirty days of such release.
The prisoner contended that the rule was cruel
and unusual punishment when applied to deny
him the right of a visit from his wife. The court,
after listing the security reasons given by the
warden for the rule, held it to be a reasonable
regulation and that the courts should not hamper
officials by interfering with long established
practices of a reasonable nature. Significantly, the
court reached the issue of reasonableness rather
than rely entirely, as in the Fwssa case, upon
administrative discretion.
It would appear that from a practical standpoint,
approved mailing and visitor lists are necessary for
several reasons. Since certain correspondents and
visitors would be more likely to attempt to formu-
late escape plans, send or give the prisoner contra-
band or be partners in an illegal business, they
must be kept from the approved lists. Ex-convicts,
for example, may be inclined to give the prisoner
information about the physical layout or routine
of the jail. Also, there may be a likelihood that if
an old business partner was involved with the
prisoner in an illegal business he would try to
obtain information concerning such business from
the inmate during the latter's incarceration.
Prison approved mailing lists are also considered
necessary because of censorship requirements.
Mail censorship is justified by officials because it
facilitates interception of escape plans, narcotics
or any other contraband. In addition, censorship
provides a means of assuring that inmates are not
controlling or otherwise participating in an illegal
2 108 Cal. App.2d 294, 238 P.2d 606 (1951).
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business or other scheme. Since censorship and
confiscation of the mails are thus essential for
effective prison management, the volume of mail
to be screened must be kept within the capacity
of a limited prison staff. This is accomplished by
limiting the number of persons with whom a
prisoner may correspond.
In dealing with mail censorship controversies,
courts generally allow a high degree of discretion to
prison officials,13 as exemplified by the leading case
of Numer v. Miller.'4 There the prisoner com-
plained that his right of free speech had been
abridged and that he was denied access to educa-
tional facilities which were afforded all other
fellow inmates. The basis for petitioner's complaint
wvas the warden's refusal to allow him to mail
lesson sheets required of an English extension
course. The prisoner's first assignment had been to
state his reasons for taking the course; his response
was that he intended upon his release to write a
book which would expose the brutality of prison
authorities. As a result of this answer the warden
said the prisoner would not be allowed to continue
with the course unless he changed his objectives.
This the petitioner would not do so the privilege
was taken away. The court refused to give any
relief to the prisoner and stated that supervision of
such disciplinary action was not within the province
of the court. Furthermore, it said, a prisoner who
abuses a privilege is not in a position to complain
if that privilege is taken from him.
Although discretionary prison censorship and
confiscation have been upheld in many other cases,
courts will not permit either where the correspond-
ence concerns only the prisoner's legal affairs and
is addressed to the courts.15 This freedom from
censorship was further extended by the court in
Brabson v. WilkinsU6 to legally related letters
addressed to the prisoner's attorney or to the
United States Attorney General.
Prisoners occasionally claim the right to com-
municate with the outside world through the
publication of manuscripts written during incar-
13 Courts have also upheld the monitoring of con-
versations between visitors and prisoners. See e.g.
People v. Morgan, 197 Cal. App.2d 90, 16 Cal. Rptr.
838 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962).
14165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
15 Spires v. Dowd, 271 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1959);
United States ex rel. Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F.
Supp. 553 (E.D. Ill.), aff'd, 261 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 949 (1959); Brabson v.
Wilkins, 45 Misc.2d 286, 256 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct.
1965).
16 45 Misc.2d 286, 256 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
ceration or in furtherance of a legitimate business
purpose. Generally, however, the courts do not
recognize such a right. In United States v. Maas,17
the court issued a preliminary injunction pro-
hibiting the publication of a prisoner written
manuscript. The court held that the manuscript
did not conform with the policy of prison rules
regulating such matters.
In Stroud v. Swopeu the issue was whether the
petitioner was entitled to carry on business affairs
regarding efforts to secure publication of books he
had written while in prison. He claimed he had the
right to reasonable correspondence in furtherance
of his business enterprise. As in Maas, the court
rejected the argument that it should decide the
question of reasonableness, stating that the burden
of supervision may not be imposed upon or assumed
by the courts. Furthermore, the court reasoned,
supervision of the treatment and discipline of
prisoners is not a jucicial function; the role of the
court is solely to deliver from imprisonment those
who are illegally confined.
A major practical reason advanced for restricting
correspondence in furtherance of a business
interest is the fear of continued illegal activity
under the guise of a legitimate business. Such
correspondence may be a potential source of
financial strength for corrupting guards and it
would unreasonably increase the volume of mail
subject to censorship. Regarding prisoner manu-
scripts, there is fear expressed by some that
writing about past crimes or abusive treatment by
prison officials may reinforce criminal behavior or
increase resentment and make rehabilitation more
difficult.19
Considering the various restrictions placed upon
a prisoner's freedom of communication with the
outside world, it is not surprising to find severe
restraints placed upon speech between fellow
inmates.20 In Fulwood v. Clemmer,2" Black Muslim
inmates held a meeting in the prison recreation
yard at which several members of the group
preached racial Muslim doctrines in a sufficiently
17 Civil Action No. 1219-'66, D.D.C., May 24, 1966.
18 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829
(1951).
19 Note, The right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL.
L. REv. 407 (1967).
20 A requirement of complete silence, however, such
as in the "Auburn System" of penology which developed
in New York in 1821, probably would be unconstitu-
tional today as cruel and unusual punishment. See
LEwIs, THE DEVELOPMENT or AMERICAN PRISONS AND
PRISON CUsToMs 1776-1845, at 86-87 (1922).
2"206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
[Vol. 59
PRISON RITRICTIONS-PR1SONER RIGHTS
loud voice to be heard by other non-Muslim
white and Negro inmates. The court held that the
Black Muslim "preachers" could be punished
for this because the language was offensive, in-
sulting and disruptive enough to engender those
feelings in non-Muslims which tend to menace
order. The court's approach indicates that the
basic reason for suppressing oral intercourse between
inmates is the necessity of maintaining discipline,
order, and security within the penal institution.
Although the practical reasons advanced for
limiting a prisoner's absolute freedom of speech
appear to deserve considerable weight, the value
of free speech to prisoners must also be taken into
account.n One of the values which has been
advanced is the prisoner's need to have an outlet
for expression. Since writing and speech are two
of the few expressive outlets a confined person may
practically be able to enjoy, stifling them may
seriously affect the basic human desire and need
of individual fulfillment. A second value of free
speech is the role which it plays in affording
society the opportunity to evaluate and judge how
well prison administrators are discharging their
function and duties. Furthermore, free speech may
indicate prisoner attitude-the knowledge of
which may be useful to prison officials in de-
tecting potential security breaches early enough to
prevent their actual occurrence. Prisoner attitude
is also useful as an indicator of progress or prob-
lems in rehabilitation programs.
The difficult task which the courts face is
balancing the values of prisoner free speech with
prison administrative considerations. In doing so,
one of the fundamental principles which should be
observed is that any arbitrary or discriminatory
rules or regulations are unconstitutional. It may
be assumed that very few prison rules will fall
into this category, so that on their face the purposes
of the restrictions will appear valid. A court
should not, however, cease inquiry at this point.
It has been suggested that a regulation may still
be invalid if a reasonable alternative which involves
less deprivation of the prisoner's freedom of speech
is available to accomplish the same purpose.2
For example, a court may ind that restricting all
prisoner group discussion serves the purpose of
maintaining prison security and discipline. Further
inquiry may show, however, that reasonable
alternatives are available to accomplish the same
2 Note, The Rigid of Expression in Prison, supra
note 19.23Id.
purpose; for instance, group discussions in a
meeting room under guard supervision. Total
deprivation would constitute an unnecessary and
unreasonable, and unconstitutional, denial of the
prisoners' rights.
It is suggested that prison officials should be
required to show that not only a valid purpose for
restraint exists, but also that such purpose is
being accomplished with a minimum deprivation
of free speech.
Consideration should also be given to allowing
limited business correspondence. Any wealth
derived in conducting an enterprise could be paid
directly to the inmate's family or held until his,
release. In this way, the prisoner would not have
the feared finaficial strength to corrupt prison
guards. Furthermore, the volume of mail could
simply be restricted within reasonable limits. It
would seem that allowing the prisoner to carry on
a legitimate business, publish books, or patent
inventionsu would reduce family hardships created
by imprisonment and might have some rehabilatory
effects on the inmate. Prohibiting all such activity
may not be the most reasonable alternative.
FEEDOm Op RELIGION
There has been a considerable amount of litiga-
tion in recent years concerning the prisoner's
right to practice his religion. A large proportion of
this has resulted from the growth of the Black
Muslim faith, with its beliefs and practices radically
different from those of Christianity or Judaism.
A distinction is drawn in the prison environ-
ment, 1 as in the outside world,26 between freedom
to believe, which is absolute, and freedom to
exercise one's belief, which may be subject to
certain limitations. These limitations are those
necessary for the protection and security of the
remainder of society, whether it be the prison
society or the freemen's society.
In McBride v. McCorkle,27 a Catholic prisoner
confined in a segregated wing of the prison alleged
that the warden's refusal to allow him, in the free
exercise of his religious beliefs, to attend Mass
with other Catholic prisoners for a period of two
2 A prisoner was denied the right to obtain a patent
on his invention during his incarceration in United
States v. Ragan, 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 846 (1954).25 Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va.
1964)'; In re Ferguson, 55 CaL2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12
Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1962).
21 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
2 44 N.J. Super: 468, 130 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1957).
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years was cruel and unusual punishment. A
chaplain was available, however, to all segregated
inmates such as the petitioner. The court, in
denying any relief, said that the social interest of
depriving petitioner the opportunity to attend
Mass with the rest of the prison population is the
necessity to preserve order and discipline in the
prison. A prisoner is privileged to worship God to
the extent his conduct in prison permits. The court
went on to state that it was not for it to review the
practical judgment of the authorities based on
prison experience.
In a similar case, United States ex rel. Cliggett v.
Pate,1 a prisoner in the prison segregation unit
was not allowed to worship with his fellow inmates
in a corporate body. The court held this not to be
discrimination against the prisoner's belief because
for security reasons all those in segregation were
equally denied such right.
Relief has also been denied a prisoner who was
prevented from obtaining Bible study aids offered
by the Watch Tower Society,29 and similarly, no
relief was given a prisoner who was forbidden to
take an Arabic grammar book, for his religious
education, into the prison recreation yard. 0 In
both cases, the courts relied on the "hands-off"
doctrine. Such actions, it was stated, were matters
of prison discipline entrusted to prison officials.
When considering the religious freedom of
Black Muslims, the first inquiry has been whether
Muslim practices are recognized for legal purposes
as constituting a "religion"." Although a few courts
have denied them such status,3 2 recognition is
generally given to the existence of a Black Muslim
religion.3 In Fulwood v. Clemmer,4 the court said
2 229 F. Supp. 818 (1964).
219 Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1944).
30 Wright v. Walkins, 26 Misc.2d 1090, 210 N.Y.S.2d
309 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
31 The practices of Black Muslims have the appear-
ance of a religion. The Muslims have their own bible,
priests, temples, parochial schools, dietary laws, and
are granted tax exemptions on an equal footing with
other churches and parochial schools by state and
municipal governments. Comment, Black Muslims in
Prison: of Muslim Rites and Constitutional Rights, 62
CoLum. L. REv. 1488, 1490 (1962).
32 In re Ferguson, 55 Cal.2d 663,361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961).
3 Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 304 F.2d 670 (4th Cir.
1962) (without predjudice); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293
F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961), dismissed, 212 F. Supp. 865
(N.D.N.Y. 1962), dismissal aff'd, 319 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.
1963); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C.
1962); Brown v. Mc Ginnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d
791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).
3206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
that a religion calls for belief in a supreme being
controlling the destiny of man and that the Black
Muslims meet this test by their belief in Allah.
Before discussing to what extent Black Muslim
religious practices may be prohibited, it may be
useful to explore the administrative problems
created by the doctrines of the religion itself.3 6
Very basic to the Black Muslim religion is an
inexorable hatred of the white race and the closely
related doctrine of Negro race supremacy. As a
manifestation of these teachings, some Muslim
practitioners feel that in time the Negroes will
have their own segregated section of the United
States. The expression of these beliefs by spoken
word, publications and actions may create an
extremely volatile prison atmosphere. Friction
may develop between Muslims and other white or
non-Muslim Negro members of the prison com-
munity. This friction may in turn create the spark
for a disturbance or even a full blown prison riot.
Because Negro prisoners often feel they are
imprisoned by "white mans' justice," the Black
Muslim religion breeds especially well in the prison
environment and produces many Muslim leaders
and ministers. A problem arises when incarcerated
members of the Muslim faith claim the right to
receive ministration from their leaders or ministers.
Prison officials must decide how to resolve the
conflict between the principle of equal treatment
of religions, and prison rules prohibiting inmates
from having any contact with former convicts who
frequently fall within this classification. 6
The basic issue confronting the courts is to what
extent do the Black Muslims have a right to
practice their religion. The answer to that question
may be dependent, however, upon the answer to
another: do Black Muslims have the same right to
practice their religion at all, as do members of
other faiths? The answers which courts have given
to this latter question range from allowing the
total deprivation of Muslims' religious privileges
to holding invalid any deprivation of such privileges
if given to other faiths.
Total deprivation is exemplified in the California
case of In re Ferguson.32 There a Black Muslim
prisoner complained of religious discrimination.
3' See LINCOLN, TnE BLACK MusLIMS iN AmERICA
(1962).3
6 Note, Suits by Black Muslim Prisoners to Enforce
Religious Rights-Obstacles to a Hearing on the Merits, 20
RUTGERS L. Rav. 528 (1966).
7 55 Cal.2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753,
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961).
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He alleged Muslims were not allowed a place of
worship, religious meetings were broken up, pur-
chase and possession of the Muslim Bible and other
religious literature was prohibited and religious
leaders were not allowed to visit the prisoners.
The prison officials admitted to the discrimination
but argued that prison discipline justified it. The
court agreed saying that it was no abuse of dis-
cretionary power for officials to manage the prison
system and to base restrictions on the potentially
serious dangers to prison security which the Black
Muslim practices involve.
A similar result upholding total deprivation of
Muslim practice was reached by a United States
District Court for the District of Kansas in Jones
v. Willingham. s In that case, a Black Muslim
inmate alleged that he was being deprived of
religious privileges accorded adherents of other
religious faiths-the right to assemble for worship,
to receive religious instruction, and to receive
Muslim literature. After discussing the Black
Muslim doctrines and the disciplinary problems
created by them the court concluded that the
warden's actions based upon his observations and
prison experience were not arbitrary, capricious or
unlawful. The court also noted that the warden
".. . not only was fully justified in imposing on the
plaintiff and others professing Muslim beliefs the
restrictions of which the plaintiff now complains,
but it was his duty to so act." 39
Other courts appear to take a middle position by
allowing partial deprivation of Black Muslim's
privileges. In Cooke v. Tramburg,4° the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the Board of Managers'
prohibition of Muslim religious services. The court
held such a restraint to be reasonable in light of
the disciplinary problems which such an assembly
of Muslims might create. Although relief was thus
denied with regard to this one privilege deprivation,
the court took cognizance of the fact that Black
Muslims were allowed other liberties in the exercise
of their religious beliefs. Purchase and possession
of their Qu'ran was permitted; they were permitted
to gather in the exercise yard up to six in number to
discuss their religion; and they could readily
communicate with Muslim ministers.
In Childs v. Pegelow,4 another case of partial
deprivation, Muslim prisoners sought to compel the
-M 248 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1965).
19 Id. at 794.
40 43 N.J. 514, 205 A.2d 889 (1964).
41321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
932 (1964).
warden to recognize their special fasting practices
during the month of Ramadan. The warden had
agreed to comply with their dietary restrictions
and to serve their meals before sunrise and after
sunset. The prisoners complained, however, that in
carrying out this agreement prison officials did not
determine sunset by the traditional Muslim
manner.4 The complaint was dismissed as not
presenting a justiciable issue. The court said that
the petitioner was merely seeking to enforce an
agreement of special privilege, not a constitution-
ally or legally protected right. The granting of
such a privilege was clearly a routine matter of
internal prison administration with which the
court would not interfere. The reference to
"special privilege" might infer that "ordinary"
religious privileges would be afforded different
treatment by this court. There was no indication
by the court that all Muslim privileges may
lawfully be denied but only that those of a "special"
or "peculiar" nature could be so treated.
A third position regarding the equal rights of
Black Muslims is taken by other courts. These
courts hold any deprivation of religious privileges
invalid if it appears that corresponding privileges
are given other faiths. Cases in this category are
generally based on either of two rationale. One is
that if prison administrators promulgate rules of
religious non-discrimination, the court will
require the prison personnel to adhere to them. The
second rationale is based upon equal protection of
the law, and is independent of the existence of
administrative rules or proclamations.
The first of these rationale was the basis for two
District of Columbia cases. In Fulwood v. Cleinmer,43
Black Muslim prisoners complained of not being
given facilities and rights on an equal basis with
members of other religions. The court held that
to allow some religious groups to hold services at
public expense while denying that right to Black
Muslims, was religious discrimination in violation
of an order of the prison commissioners to make
facilities available without regard to race or
religion. Similarly, since the Department of
Correction purchased religious medals for Catho-
lics, Protestants, and Jews with public funds it
was held that medals must also be made available
42The Black Muslim method of determining day-
light hours for fasting during the month of Ramadan is
by inspection of a black and a white thread held in the
air. If no difference can be detected the hours of dark-
ness have commenced. The prison officials, instead of
using this test, relied upon Naval Observatory time.
43206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
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to Muslims in order to comply with the com-
missioners' regulation.
In Sewell v. Pegelow,44 prisoners professing the
Black Muslim faith alleged that they were dis-
criminated against solely because of their religious
beliefs. They complained of being denied the right to
wear religious medals, to communicate with religious
advisors, to recite prayers, and to receive publica-
tions. The court held that the complaints stated
enough to require a hearing, and remanded the
case to the district court. A cause of action was
stated because this was not an attack upon dis-
ciplinary measures nor bare conclusory allegations
of a denial of constitutional rights; it was an
extensively detailed specification of deprivations
and hardships inflicted by personnel where there
had been no apparent infraction of any prison
rules. It was, therefore, unlike cases where the
courts bad declined to interfere because of dis-
ciplinary measures imposed under the authority
of normal regulations of the institution. On a
second appeal, the court dismissed the case after
consideration of a letter from counsel for both
parties which set forth the Policy Order of the
District of Columbia Government Regarding Non-
discrimination, and which specified with particu-
larity the rights Black Muslims were to have to
enable them to practice their religion on an equal
basis with members of other faiths.
The second basis for holding invalid any depriva-
tion of Muslims' religious provileges-equal
protection without regard to administrative action
-is exemplified in State ex rel. Tate v. Gubbage.45
In that case the court held it to be a denial of
equal protection of the laws to deny Black Muslims
equal facilities for religious services and to forbid
them to wear religious medals on the same basis as
other faiths. Significantly, the court rejected the
argument that equal protection was qualified by
the dear and present danger test; the right to
equal protection was held to be "almost" an ab-
solute right, although the exact significance of
"almost" was not indicated.
It should be noted that in the Sewell case, al-
though the second appeal was dismissed on the
basis of assurances contained in the administrative
policy order, the court appeared ready even without
such a policy order to hold invalid any deprivation
of Muslim privileges if corresponding rights were
44 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961), appeal dismissed per
stipudation, 304 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1962) (without
prejudice).
45 210 A.2d 555 (Del: Super. Ct. 1965).
given other faiths. It is probable, therefore, that
the Sewell court would follow the Cubbage decision
if a similar situation arose.
As seen by the preceding cases, courts have
differed greatly in their solution to the Black
Muslim religion problem. As in all other areas of
prisoner's rights, however, arbitrary or discrimina-
tory regulations based solely on a prisoner's
religion and its teachings should not be per-
mitted. Such discrimination was allowed by a lower
court in Cooper v. Pate.46 The prisoner alleged that
because of religious discrimination he was not
permitted to purchase a copy of the "Koran". The
court upon taking judicial notice of certain social
studies of the Black Muslim movement found the
religion dangerous and threatening to prison
security in general. As a result, relief was denied.
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a
per curiam opinion, stating that a cause of action
Was shown on the authority of the Sewell case. 7
Perhaps the test framed by the court in Brount
v. McGinnis4 represents the most equitable balanc-
ing of interests when dealing with freedom to
practice religion. In reply to the contention that
restrictions on religious practices were valid merely
because of the potential dangers inherent in the
Muslim faith the court said: "Although potential
dangers if realized may justify curtailment or with-
drawal of petitioner's qualified rights, mere specu-
lation.., is insufficient .... " 4 There appears to
be no valid reason to deny any religion equal pro-
tection of the laws, even if it is feared that its
members might abuse its rights in the indefinite
future. On the other hand, prison officials should
not have to wait for a breach in discipline and or-
der if such a breach is imminent and if it is practic-
ally speaking realized. It must be remembered that
religious practice is not absolute but is always sub-
ject to the overriding interests of society. So long
as officials have a reasonable basis for taking away
the qualified privilege, this cannot be considered
discriminatory nor violative of prisoners' constitu-
tional rights.
46 324 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd per curiam,
378 U.S. 546 -(1964).
47 Cooper v. ,Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). This case
may be distinguished from Jones v. Willingham,
Supra Note 38, in that the latter case was based upon
specific disciplinary problems within the warden's
experience and- not merely upon judicial notice in
general.
48 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E:2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d
497 (1962).
41 Id. at 793.
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AccEss TO THE COURTS
It has been stated: "A right of access to the
courts is one of the rights a prisoner dearly
retains." 50 A denial or undue restriction of reason-
able access is a denial of due process." As was
indicated previously in connection with the pris-
oner's freedom of speech, mail addressed to the
courts or to the United States Attorney General is
not subject to prison censorship or confiscation. 52
In Ex Parte Hull," where a prison official refused
to mail an inmate's habeas corpus petition, the
United States Supreme Court said:
The state and its officials may not abridge or im-
pair petitioner's right to apply to a federal court
for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether a petition for
writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is
properly drawn and what allegations it must con-
tain are questions for the court alone to determine.54
In connection with the prisoner's right to mail
his petition to the proper officials, it has also been
held that prison officials may not punish inmates
for making false statements of deprivations until
there has been a court adjudication of the allega-
tions on the merits." To allow such punishment
would be to permit prison officials, against whom
the complaints are directed, to be the judge and
jury as to the truth of the allegations.
There may be, however, certain limitations on a
prisoner's right of access to the courts when his
purpose is not to complain of an unlawful restric-
tion of his rights. One such restiction is that an
inmate may be denied the right to institute civil
proceedings involving his affairs prior to con-
viction. 56 Another is that a prisoner may not be
permitted to sue prison officials for damages during
his incarceration arising out of alleged injuries
due to mistreatment or prison negligence.5
50 Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir.
1966). Accord, Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941);
Kirby v. Thomas, 336 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1964);
Warfield v. Raymond, 195 Md. 711, 71 A.2d 870
(1950).
1 "Hymes v. Dickson, 232 F. Supp. 796 (N.D.Cal.
1964); Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore.
1959), rev'd sub norn., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d
632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
&
2 See text accompanying notes 15 and 16 supra.
312 U.S. 546 (1941).
uId. at 549.
55 Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C.
1962); In re Riddle, 57 Cal.2d 848, 372 P.2d 304, 22
Cal. Rptr. 472 (1962).
"6Harell v. State, 17 Misc.2d 950, 188 N.Y.S.2d
683 (Ct.Cl. 1959).
7Tabor v. Harwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1955).
It has been held, however, that a prisoner may sue
Even though the prisoner has free access to the
courts to complain of what he believes to be un-
lawful deprivations, exercising this right is often
conditioned upon the means available to him to
prepare the necessary papers. A number of diffi-
culties involving this right to prepare have faced
inmates in the past. The prison may be unable to
provide many law books and delay may be en-
countered in the use of those it is able to provide.2
For security reasons, a prisoner may only be
allowed to obtain a limited supply of legal materials
from approved sources, 5 may not be allowed to
keep legal materials in his cell,6° and in many
instances is not permitted to receive help from
another prisoner in preparing.6 A prisoner may
also be restrained in efforts to obtain the help of
counsel even though he is financially capable of
paying for such assistance."
In recent years, however, greater recognition
has been given to the fact that the right to prepare
is basic to any realistic free access to the courts.
In Bailleaux v. Holmes," the court was aware that
prison authorities must be able to maintain effec-
tive discipline, but it stated that "this end could
not be achieved by stifling the study of law, where
such study is necessary to the effective utilization
of a basic right." " In that case, prisoners had
alleged that they had to engage in their own legal
work because they could not afford an attorney.
On subsequent appeal, the decision was reversed,
but the reason for reversal was the appellate
court's finding that the prisoners did have reason-
able access to the courts, and not a repudiation of
the basic proposition quoted from the district
court's opinion.
Even where the right to study law and to have
access to legal materials is recognized, a distinction
may be drawn between the genuine need of such
material in order to present a claim and access
under the Federal Civil Rights Act even if civil suits
by prisoners are prohibited by the state. McCollum v.
Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955). See
generally 21 Am..JuR.2d Criminal Law §621 (1965); 18
C. J. S. Convicts §7 (1939).
w Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore.
1959), rev'd sub nom., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d
632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
51 Id. at 365.
60Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 862 (1961).
61 Wilson v. Dixon, 251 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958).
6"Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore.
1959), rev'd sub nor., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d
'632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S: 862 (1961).
6Id.
64 Id. at 361.
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merely to engage in a "fishing expedition." In
Roberts v. Pepersack,65 the court stated:
The right to petition or correspond with the
court does not include the right to be furnished
with an extensive collection of legal materials.
Such a collection will encourage "fishing ex-
peditions" in which an inmate seeks out cases
where the allegations may receive favorable con-
sideration and adopts those allegations as his
own. 66
The court indicated that all a prisoner need do is set
forth his allegations, even if not in terms of con-
stitutional deprivations, and the court will frame
them properly for him. Exactly how the distinc-
tion between "fishing expeditions" and genuine
need is to be determined is not clear. It may
depend upon whether the alleged right appears to
have any reasonable foundation.
If a prisoner is able to obtain legal materials and
is in the process of preparing his petition, he will
usually desire to keep such materials in his cell in
order to assemble the document ultimately to be
transmitted to the court. In In re Schoengarth,&
the court said that a prisoner has this right. It
held that reasonable access to the courts includes
the right of a prisoner to possess in his cell the
legal materials which he desires to include in his
petition while it is being put into a mailable form.
Merely having access to law books and other
legal material, however, is not enough. Prisoners
may need some form of personal assistance, but
such assistance will usually be difficult to obtain.
Allowing prisoners to help each other in preparing
petitions is generally forbidden by prison regula-
tions. In one federal district court case, however,
such a state regulation was held invalid, and a
prisoner was given the right to receive aid from a
fellow inmate." The court said that a state prison
regulation forbidding prisoners from preparing
habeas corpus petitions for other inmates interfered
with the federal statutory right of prisoners, in-
capable of acting for themselves, to have someone
act on their behalf.
The right of an inmate to consult with an at-
torney has also been recognized. In the case of
In re Allison, 69 the court held a prisoner to have the
right to consult privately with his counsel at
65 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966).66Id. at 433.
67 57 Cal. Rptr. 600, 425 P.2d 200 (u.Ct. 1967).
6 johnson v. Avery 252 F. Supp753 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966).
69 57 Cal. Rptr. 593, 425 P.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
reasonable times in preparation for trial and during
the pendency of an appeal. As previously indicated,
the prisoner has this same right of communication
when carried on through the use of the mails.
70
Probably the foremost practical problems to be
considered when evaluating a prisoner's right of
access to the courts is that of spurious claims and
the amount of litigation which prisoners generate.
An inmate may feel that he is entitled to contest
every rule and regulation he dislikes. Moreover,
because he is in prison he may have a substantial
amount of time available in which to contrive
various allegations of unlawful deprivations. The
burden on the courts will be very great if they
must hear every claim that a disgruntled prisoner
thinks warrants relief. For these reasons courts are
hesitant about enlarging the inmates means of
research and preparation, and often rely upon the
"fishing expedition" distinction in order to avoid
doing so.
Furthermore, prisons are confronted with the
problem that they are ordinarily unable financially
to provide what prisoners would consider adequate
legal research facilities. It must also be kept in
mind that a person is not sent to prison to obtain a
legal education, and as a consequence, cannot
expect to have made available to him a complete
set of even one state's statutes or decisions. More-
over, even if the prison were able and willing to
provide research tools for their inmates, "jailhouse
lawyers" might be created. Such prisoners might
exchange legal advice or other legal services for
favors from "client" inmates. In addition, such
novices might be inclined to misconstrue the law
and thus create disciplinary problems with those
prisoners who were advised that they were being
deprived of their legal rights.
Although these practical considerations ad-
vanced for some limitations on a prisoner's access
to the courts cannot be ignored, it must be con-
stantly kept in mind that the right of a prisoner
to have his complaint heard is probably the most
important of all his rights. Without free access to
the courts, all other recognized prisoner rights have
no effective means of protection. This was aptly
stated by the court in Coleman v. Peyton.n It said
"[Access to the courts] is a precious right, and its
administratively unfettered exercise may be of
incalculable importance in the protection of
rights even more precious." 72
70 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
-' 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966).7
2Id. at 907.
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While it is true that prisoners may bring spurious
and unmerited claims before the court, this is a
problem inherent in a free legal system. Many
unfounded claims are also brought by citizens
outside of jail, but it is not thought that as a
result of this access to the legal process should be
restricted. Similar reasoning may be applied to
prisoners with equal validity. Closely related to
this spurious claim problem is the familiar "flood
of litigation" argument. An adequate response to it,
however, was stated in UniedStates ex rel Marcial
v. Fay;7 3 "We must not play fast and loose with
basic constitutional rights in the interest of
administrative efficiency." 74
Even with a generally recognized right of access
to the courts, it must be remembered that for
indigent prisoners this right is meaningless without
adequate means to engage in their own legal
preparation. This does not mean that extensive
legal resources should or must be furnished or
that reasonable restrictions may not be placed on
their use. What it does seem to require is that no
restriction should be placed upon the means of
preparation meant only to discourage or totally
prevent petitioning the courts for relief. An example
of such a restriction would be denying a prisoner
the use of the prison library as a punishment for
the exercise of a right he feels he has and wants to
establish through adjudication. Any such restric-
tion in the right of access to the courts cannot be
considered a reasonable incident of punishment.
Providing an indigent prisoner with the means
of preparation is not the only way, however, to
preserve his right of access to the courts. An effec-
tive alternative would be to provide him with
court appointed counsel. Since the complaining
prisoner is not an accused in a criminal prosecu-
tion, but is rather the plaintiff in a civil action, it is
clear he has no federal constitutional right to
assigned counsel under the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution" or under similar
state constitutional provisions.76 But it is suggested
that by giving an inmate such a right by statute or
otherwise his need for an adequate means of self
7 247 F.2d 662, cerl. denied, 355 U.S. 915 (2d Cir.
1957).7 41 Id. at 669.
7 6"In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall
enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense." U. S. CoNsT. amend. VI; Dorsey v.
Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
890 (1945).
76 People ex rd. Ross v. Ragen, 391 IlL. 419, 63
N.E.2d 874 (1945).
preparation would no longer exist, and the prob-
lems of the prison in providing those means would
be solved.
CONCLUSION
Although the "hands-off" doctrine has not been
abandoned, it is apparent from this brief survey
of prisoners' rights that at least some of the courts
are facing the difficult task of balancing the interests
of inmates against the practical considerations
involved in effectively operating a penal institu-
tion27 While such balancing may be considered by
some to be a court invasion into prison administra-
tion, it must be remembered that, presumably, this
interference will be only to the extent necessary to
protect constitutional rights. The courts are
capable of perceiving what regulations are reason-
ably necessary in a particular prison and should
accept the responsibility of judicially defining what
rights a prisoner retains when lawfully incarcerated
rather than leave it to administrative discretion.
Some would probably argue, also, that judicial
determination of prisoner complaints places too
great a burden upon the courts because many of
the allegations will turn out to be undeserving of
relief. This argument is not without merit, but
it does not justify leaving prisoners at the sole
mercy of prison officials to fashion rules and regula-
tions as they please.
A compromise solution may be to establish by
statute some form of quasi-judicial or administra-
tive review procedure where a complaining inmate
could take his claim in the first instance. The courts
would then merely serve in a appellate capacity in
reviewing such agency's decisions when one party
was unsatisfied with the resolution. To assure fair
and impartial treatment of prisoners such an
agency would preferably be an arm of the court
and under its direction rather than under the
auspices of the prison system. Hearings could be
held in the various prisons at designated times in a
"circuit riding" fashion. State agencies under
state court supervision would travel to state penal
institutions, and federal agencies under similar
federal supervision would hear complaints of
7 This need of balancing interests was recognized in
United States exrel. Yaris v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp.
143 (N.D.N.Y. 1953) at 144 where the court said:
It is hard to believe that persons... convicted of
crime are at the mercy of the executive department
and yet it is unthinkable that the judiciary should
take over the operation of the... prisons. There
must be some middle ground between these
extremes.
